Usamah “Sam” Husseini

In a gesture that was remarkable for an architect of a war that had torn the nation apart, McNamara ordered the collection of a set of documents that, on release, could expose his own judgment to harsh criticism and bitter attack. He wanted scholars to be able to examine the economic, political, and military bases of Vietnam policy when they eventually came to analyze how the war grew out of the inherited postulates of post-World War II American politics ... [McNamara said his objective] "was to bequeath to scholars the raw material from which they could reexamine the events of the time. If historians are to make a careful examination, they need the raw materials. I simply asked that these be brought together, and I have no regrets for having done so." (pg. 27)

As months went by, legal scholars and journalists alike began to realize that the 6-3 Supreme Court decision in the cases of New York Times v. United States and United States v. Washington Post had been a rather hollow victory for the press. The unsigned opinion of the court said only that the government had failed to carry its heavy burden of proof to obtain a prior restrain, and the individual justices' opinions had as many nasty words for the press as for the government. Many editors felt strongly that the newspapers were worse off after the Pentagon Papers than they had been before it; and in private conversations high Justice Department officials concurred in that assessment. "We proved on thing emphatically," said on Justice policy maker, "that there can be prior restrain of publication while a case is being reviewed in the courts." (303-304)